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FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
RELIGION-OCTOBER 2009 TERM
Burt Neuborne * and Michael C. Dorf
I. INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR NEUBORNE: The First Amendment cases be-
fore the Supreme Court were, quite possibly, this Term's most impor-
tant decisions. The cases to be discussed cover campaign financing,'
support to foreign terrorist groups,2 religious symbols on public
property,3 and conflicts between equality and freedom of associa-
tion.4
II. CORPORATE-FUNDED CAMPAIGN SPEECH
It is safe to say that Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission' changed the Term dramatically. It was a seismic case and a
case of potentially enormous practical importance for our democratic
. This is an edited version of an oral presentation given at the Practising Law Institute's
Twelfth Annual Supreme Court Review in New York, New York on August 3, 2010. While
I am grateful to the editors for adding citations and cleaning up my more egregious oral em-
barrassments, and while the edited version accurately reflects my substantive views, it
should not be cited as my work or confused with my voice.
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (holding that
corporations have a right to make independent expenditures on free speech grounds).
2 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (discussing the
federal crime of " 'provid[ing] material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion' " (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010))).
See Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1812 (2010) (discussing a claim that a cross lo-
cated on federal land violates the Establishment Clause).
4 See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010) (discussing whether
a public law school's requirement that student groups accept all applicants impaired the
Christian Legal Society's "First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association,
and free exercise of religion").
130 S. Ct. 876.
63
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system.
The precise question presented was whether a video made by
a nonprofit ideological corporation-an hour-long critical documen-
tary on Hillary Clinton-was an "electioneering communication,"
falling under the provisions of the McCain-Feingold law banning
corporate-funded electioneering communications from being broad-
cast on the electronic media just before a federal election.6 There are
three blackout periods-just before the convention, just before the
general election, and just before a primary election.7 The blackout
period at issue in Citizens United was thirty days before a partisan
primary-in this case, a Democratic presidential primary in which
Hillary Clinton was a candidate.'
The Federal Election Commission ("FEC") argued in the Su-
preme Court that since the video was a corporate-funded electioneer-
ing communication, it could not be disseminated on cable TV, even
as a voluntary download, during the thirty day period prior to the
Democratic primary.9 The FEC did not bring suit against Citizens
United.' 0 Rather, Citizens United sued the FEC." Citizens United,
claiming to be frightened that Hillary: The Movie would be treated by
the FEC as covered by McCain-Feingold as the " 'functional equiva-
lent of express advocacy,' " which would result in "subjecting [Citi-
zens United] to civil and criminal penalties," 2 sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to protect the group from prosecution. 3  The FEC
took the bait, insisted that the video fell within McCain-Feingold, and
litigated an extremely weak case on the worst possible facts. It was
good lawyering by Citizens United. General Custer was advising the
6 Id at 888 (citing 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(2) (West 2010)).
See id. at 887; see also Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 434(0(3) (West 2010) (" '[E]lectioneering communication' means any broadcast, cable, or
satellite communication which . . . is made within [sixty] days before a general, special, or
runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or [thirty] days before a primary or
preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party.").
8 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (discussing Citizens United's intention "to make Hil-
lary available through video-on-demand within [thirty] days of the 2008 primary elections").
SId. at 888,891.
10 See id. at 888 (noting that it was Citizens United which initiated litigation by seeking
"declaratory and injunctive relief against the FEC").
" Id.
12 Id. at 888-89 (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 (2003),
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876).
13 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888.
64 [Vol. 27
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Citizens United initially took a very narrow litigation posi-
tion, arguing: first, that the video was a documentary, not a covered
"electioneering communication" and second, that the documentary
did not fall within the blackout period because the video was unlikely
to be downloaded by more than 50,000 people eligible to vote in the
Democratic primary.14 Finally, Citizens United argued that if the do-
cumentary did fall within the statute, it was protected by the First
Amendment, as applied,'" but avoided arguing that the statute was
facially unconstitutional, taking the advice of the lower court judges
that such arguments do not typically succeed in the Supreme Court.16
A. What the Court Decided
The first time this case was heard by the Supreme Court, the
Solicitor General's office blundered, conceding during questioning
that Congress had the power to order a book partially funded by a
corporation off the shelves thirty days before an election.'7 The Soli-
citor General argued that Congress could "ban corporate expenditures
for almost all forms of communication stemming from a corpora-
tion," including books.' The gasps from the audience and from the
Justices were audible. The response may have been honest, but it
was wrong. The Solicitor General should have argued that Congress
lacks the power to ban communications that require affirmative co-
operation by a willing hearer.
Several days later, the Court scheduled a re-argument on
whether the statute was constitutional on its face.' 9 In a five-to-four
decision, the Court ruled that the blackout of corporate-funded elec-
tioneering communications thirty days before an election was facially
14 Id. at 888-89, 890 (reasoning that (1) Hillary merely examines certain historical events,
thus classifying it as a documentary and (2) "each separate transmission . . . will be seen by
just one household-not 50,000 or more persons").
15 Id at 893 ("Citizens United ... asserted . .. that the FEC . . . violated its First Amend-
ment right to free speech.").
16 See id at 931-32 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" See id at 904 (majority opinion).
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 ("The Government contends that Austin permits it to
ban corporate expenditures for almost all forms of communication stemming from a corpora-
tion. If Austin were correct, the Government could prohibit a corporation from expressing
political views in media beyond those presented here, such as by printing books.").
19 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009).
65 ,2011]
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unconstitutional because corporations have a First Amendment right
to spend unlimited funds on independent expenditures, as opposed to
contributions, designed to affect the outcome of an election. 20 Inde-
pendent expenditures by corporations, the Court held, are fully pro-
tected by the First Amendment.2'
The practical implications stemming from the Court's deci-
sion are profound. For example, prior to the decision, Exxon operat-
ed a political action committee ("PAC").22 Individuals connected to
the corporation-such as eligible employees and retiree sharehold-
ers-made voluntary contributions to the Exxon PAC. 23  The Exxon
PAC would then make independent expenditures or contributions to
candidates.24 The Exxon PAC, in the last major campaign cycle,
contributed $721,998 to federal candidates.25 It raised the money
from voluntary participants within the Exxon community, in order to
engage in these types of political activities.26 Exxon's treasury funds
during the same period amounted to approximately $80 billion.27 In
terms of the potential effect of Citizens United, we have now moved
from a position where Exxon was able to tap over $700,000 that had
been voluntarily collected from members of the Exxon community
for use in politics, to a vastly larger amount in its treasury account
generated by sales and items utterly unconnected to politics. 28 The
full weight of that treasury is now theoretically available for indepen-
20 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 ("The First Amendment does not permit Congress to
make these categorical distinctions based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the
content of the political speech.").
21 See id. (expressing that there is "no basis for allowing the Government to limit corpo-
rate independent expenditures").
22 See Political Contributions and Lobbying, EXXoNMOBL, http://www.exxonmobil.com/
Corporate/aboutoperations political data.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2010).
23 See id.
24 See id.
25 ExxonMobil: 2008 PAC Summary Data, OPENSECRETS (July 13, 2009),
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/lookup2.php?strlD=C0121368&cycle=2008. Eleven per-
cent of expenditures were contributed to Democratic candidates, while eighty-nine percent
were given to Republican candidates. Id.
26 See Political Contributions and Lobbying, supra note 22.
27 EXXONMOBIL, 2008 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 38 (2009), available at http://www.ex
xonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/newspub_sar_2008.pdf.
28 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887 (explaining that PACs were separate funds spe-
cifically created because § 441b(b)(2) barred corporations from using their money from their
general treasuries to fund such communications). Since the statute has been struck down as
unconstitutional, corporations are no longer barred from using their general treasuries to
fund electioneering communications. Id. at 913.
66 [Vol. 27
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There is, however, an important empirical question: How
much corporate support or opposition for a particular political candi-
date will actually result? Many argue that corporations will avoid
participating in electoral politics because they fear significant con-
sumer and shareholder reactions. While the amounts that will actual-
ly be spent by corporations are still very much in question, what is
known is that the treasuries of large corporations are now available
for independent expenditure in ways that are clearly, indeed conce-
dedly, designed to influence the outcome of an election. 29  A vast
pool of money has now been unlocked that can be used for campaign
spending.
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, is one of
the most dedicated First Amendment voices ever to serve on the Su-
preme Court. 30 He is a remarkably consistent defender and deep be-
liever in the notion of free speech, 31 and the right of hearers to make
decisions based upon a free flow of information.3 2
Justice Kennedy does not start his opinion with a freestanding
analysis of whether corporations have First Amendment rights. Ra-
ther, he begins by noting that the Court is deeply suspicious of rules
that treat similarly situated speakers differently. 3 He notes that there
29 See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbies' New Power: Cross Us, and Our Cash Will
Bury You, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 2010, at Al (criticizing that "[t]he Supreme Court has
handed a new weapon to lobbyists. . . . [A] lobbyist can now tell any elected official that my
company, labor union or interest group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising
against your re-election.").
30 See Eugene Volokh, How the Justices Voted in Free Speech Cases, 1994-2002, UCLA
LAW, http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/howvoted.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) (showing
that Justice Kennedy had the highest percentage of decisions taking the speech-protective
position of all the justices between 1994-2002: "Kennedy 74.5%; Thomas 61.1%; Souter
61.0%; Stevens 55.7%; Ginsburg 53.6%; Scalia 49.6%; O'Connor 44.7%; Rehnquist 41.8%;
Breyer 39.7%").
31 Justice Kennedy has long taken a strong stance on protecting political speech under the
First Amendment, even when it results in a decision he does not like. See, e.g., Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (joining the decision hold-
ing that burning of the American Flag is protected political speech).
32 See, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (stating that "[t]he right of citizens to in-
quire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to en-
lightened self-government and a necessary means to protect it").
3 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898-99. The Court stated:
By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Gov-
ernment deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the right to use
speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speak-
2011] 67
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are two different categories of speakers before the Court-natural
persons and corporations-which are being treated differently. 4 JUS-
tice Kennedy then questions why corporate speakers should be
treated differently than natural speakers.35 He posits three possible
reasons for this difference in treatment.
B. Three Arguments to Justify Section 203 of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
i. The Equality Rationale
First, Justice Kennedy considers the argument that limiting
corporate electioneering is justified to prevent a rich speaker from
overwhelming speakers with less money. As a society, we do not
want to have a situation where one speaker is so powerful that he or
she overwhelms a less powerful speaker's ability to exercise political
influence.3 1 Under this rationale, banning corporate electioneering is
justified to equalize political influence.39 Justice Kennedy rejects the
equalization rationale, following the holding in Buckley v. Valeo40
that strong voices may not be silenced in an effort to increase the rel-
ative strength of weak ones, and holding that "[t]he First Amend-
ment's protections do not depend on the speaker's 'financial ability to
engage in public discussion.' "41 Contrary precedent in Austin was
er's voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public
of the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speak-
ers are worthy of consideration.
Id. at 899.
34 See id at 898-901.
" See id.
36 See id. at 903 (noting that the government abandoned their reliance on the anti-
distortion rationale and instead argued the compelling interests of anti-corruption and share-
holder-protection).
" See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905.
38 Id. at 904 (stating that the anti-distortion rationale's purpose has been described as
"prevent[ing] corporations from obtaining 'an unfair advantage in the political marketplace'
by using 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' " (quoting Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990))).
3 Id. (stating that the antidistortion rationale has also been described as "an interest 'in
equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elec-
tions' " (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976))).
40 424 U.S. 1.
41 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49).
68 [Vol. 27
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ii. The Anti-Corruption Rationale
Second, Justice Kennedy considers the anti-corruption ratio-
nale as applied to large independent expenditures by corporations.43
Such a rationale had already been accepted in the context of cam-
paign contributions." It is the reason why the Court will not permit
corporations to make direct financial contributions.45 In Buckley,
however, the Court had rejected the applicability of the anti-
corruption rationale to independent expenditures because, by defini-
tion, the person spending the money-the speaker-and the politician
never meet, rendering it impossible to engage in quid pro quo corrup-
tion.46 Justice Kennedy ruled that since the Court had already re-
jected the anti-corruption rationale for independent expenditures in
Buckley, stare decisis prevented its reconsideration in the context of
corporate independent expenditures. 7
iii. The Shareholder-Protection Rationale
The third rationale-corporate self-governance-was the ra-
tionale that then Solicitor General Elena Kagan, on behalf of the gov-
ernment, used in her argument.48 This theory relies on the fact that
management's money is not being used. Rather, it is the sharehold-
ers' money, which should not be used for politics without the share-
holders' permission, since it may interfere with the shareholders' po-
litical rights.49 Justice Kennedy was sympathetic to the argument,
but ruled that less drastic means existed to assure shareholder con-
sent.so Before completely eliminating the corporation's right to
speak, the Court had to determine whether there was a narrower way
42 Id. at 913.
43 See id. at 908-11.
4 Id. at 908.
45 id
4 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 ("The appearance of influence or access ... will not
cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By definition, an independent expendi-
ture is political speech presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a candidate.").
47 See id. at 908.
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to accomplish this task.s"
Justice Kennedy considered all three rationales together and
found that there was no real basis for discriminating against corporate
speech. 52 Accordingly, he overruled two cases-Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, decided in 1990, and McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission,54 decided in 2003-that had upheld limits on
corporate speech. Since, Justice Kennedy reasoned the cases' intel-
lectual premises had been eroded, the Court was justified in overrul-
ing them. 55
There is an irony in Justice Kennedy's treatment of stare deci-
sis. Commitment to stare decisis was Justice Kennedy's justification
for refusing to consider the equality rationale or the anti-corruption
rationale, since each had been rejected in Buckley, a 1976 case. 56
However, Justice Kennedy ignored stare decisis when addressing
Austin and McConnell, more recent cases that had accepted the equal-
ity and anti-corruption rationales. 7
Corporations can speak freely, held Justice Kennedy, because
they disseminate information of value to listeners, even when the "in-
formation" threatens to swamp competitors and generates a fear of
undue influence.
C. The Likely Impact of Citizens United
Citizens United gives a green light to corporations and unions
to use their treasury funds for political purposes, as long as there is no
coordination with the candidate.59 One hundred years ago, there was
a similar issue before the Supreme Court. The Justices had to decide
" See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. In its evaluation, the Court noted that the statute
was both underinclusive and overinclusive. Id.
s2 See id. at 903-11.
* 494 U.S. 652.
1 540 U.S. 93.
s Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913.
See id. at 904, 908, 913.
s See id at 913.
ss Id. at 912 ("Speakers have become adept at presenting citizens with sound bites, talking
points, and scripted messages that dominate the 24-hour news cycle. Corporations, like in-
dividuals, do not have monolithic views. On certain topics corporations may possess valua-
ble expertise, leaving them the best equipped to point out errors or fallacies in speech of all
sorts, including the speech of candidates and elected officials.").
'9 See id. at 910-11.
70 [Vol. 27
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whether corporations enjoy self-incrimination rights under the Fifth
Amendment. 60  The Justices agreed that individuals who worked in
the corporation had self-incrimination rights, but the question re-
mained whether the corporation itself had self-incrimination rights. 6 1
The early twentieth century Supreme Court ruled that corporations do
not have self-incrimination rights because they are not human-they
are an artificial creation of law.62 There exists no spark of the divine
and no conscience-there is no dignitary interest to protect. 63 Corpo-
rations, ruled the Court, are nothing more than a device to assemble
and manage capital to achieve a specific economic purpose. Accor-
dingly, they do not have self-incrimination rights.' This is still the
law, with Justice Kennedy's enthusiastic concurrence.
What happened over the last one hundred years that allows
somebody as extraordinarily principled as Justice Kennedy to begin
anthropomorphizing corporations-to think of corporations as enti-
ties that have the same rights as human beings? When Justice Ken-
nedy begins his opinion, he begs the question by assuming that there
are two similarly situated speakers being treated differently.65
The threshold question is whether a corporation constitutes a
similarly-situated speaker under the First Amendment in the first
place.66 A corporation is a First Amendment speaker only if you
anthropomorphize it as a human agent that speaks.67 If things keep
60 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
61 See id.
62 See id. The Court stated:
[T]he corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorpo-
rated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges
and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the
limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no
contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation
are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation....
While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating ques-
tions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a
corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to
show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.
Id.
61 See id.
6 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 75.
6 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895-97.
6 See id. at 899-900 (analyzing the First Amendment as applied to corporations).
Id. at 900 ("The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is
protected. Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to 'the discussion,
debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to
2011] 71
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going this way, soon corporations will be able to legally adopt
people. If you are lucky, one day you will be able to marry a corpo-
ration. Until then, you will have to be content with being screwed by
them.
There were a number of narrower ways to decide this case.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, listed the
narrower ways. 8 One presented the question of whether the speech
fell within the statute at all. 69 Was this an electioneering communica-
tion?70 Was it likely to reach 50,000 people?n The second was the
question of de minimis, which got lost in all of the discussions.72 The
amount of corporate money that was used to fund Citizens United's
documentary was less than one percent of the total production cost.73
It was a trace amount of corporate money used for the communica-
tion.74 Several courts of appeal have held that there is a de minimis
exception to the statute.7 ' These courts have stated that if there is on-
ly a trace amount of corporate money, the statute is not implicated.76
foster." (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 75 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
" See id. at 937-38 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
three of the narrower grounds that were bypassed by the majority: (1) a ruling that a feature-
length film distributed via video-on-demand does not qualify as an "electioneering commu-
nication" under the statute; (2) the expansion of the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exemp-
tion to cover nonprofit organizations that accept only de minimis contributions from corpora-
tions operating for-profit; and (3) by declining to adopt the notion that all types of speakers
must be treated the same, "the Court could have easily limited the breadth of its constitution-
al holding").
69 Id at 937.
70 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("The sponsors of BCRA acknowledge that the FEC's implementing regulations do not
clearly apply to video-on-demand transmissions.").
7' See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii) (2010) (stating that public distribution of election ma-
terial for a candidate running for President or Vice President will be within the definition of
"electioneering communication" when it "[c]an be received by 50,000 or more persons in a
[s]tate where a primary election .. . is being held within [thirty] days[,] or" within thirty days
between the beginning and end of a national nominating convention).
7 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 Brief for Appellant at 41, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL
61467 at *41.
7 See id.
7s Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 937 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76 See, e.g., Colo. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1148-49 (10th
Cir. 2007) (holding that if corporate contributions make up a minimal part of an organiza-
tion's income, it may still fall within the exception); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v.
Bartlett, 168 F.3d 705, 714 (4th Cir. 1999) (receiving up to a "modest percentage [8%] of
revenue" from corporations still enables the organization to fall within the exception); Fed.
10
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The Court ignored the de minimis exception, declined to consider
whether the documentary was likely to reach 50,000 people and
whether it was an electioneering communication, and ignored the as-
applied First Amendment issue of applying the statute to grass roots
ideological groups with only trace corporate funding.n
Since municipal employee unions are very large engines for
campaign spending, union funds may balance corporate expenditures,
although, the potential for union spending is dwarfed by the potential
for corporate spending. The real empirical question is how many
corporations are going to engage in politics? Many corporate execu-
tives do not want to fragment the market in this way. Thus, the dis-
closure statute is important. The disclosure statute would have been a
vehicle to create a brake on corporate spending. Once disclosure
breaks down, as it did, money can be laundered through a variety of
ways, making it very difficult to track the money back to the original
corporate source.
PROFESSOR DORF: Although I do not agree with the ruling
in Citizens United, I would like to add a word in defense of the prop-
osition that the First Amendment can be sensibly interpreted to give
at least some protection to the rights of corporate speakers. The best
available argument does not depend on the assumption that corpora-
tions are, in all respects, just like natural persons. Rather, one can ar-
gue that corporate speech should be presumptively protected in order
to protect the constitutional right of natural persons to receive infor-
mation.
For example, Lamont v. Postmaster General78 involved the
ability of a United States citizen to receive information from foreign
sources, even though non-citizens outside the country may have no
cognizable First Amendment rights. 79 The government sought to ban
the receipt of foreign-sourced material that it labeled "communist po-
Election Comm'n v. Survival Educ. Fund, 65 F.3d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a
group receiving less than 1% funding from corporations was still able to fall within the ex-
ception); Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding the key issue to be
the amount of corporate funding and holding that a group that has not received significant
contributions from for-profit corporations can fall within the exception as long as the contri-
butions received remains substantially the same).
n7 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.
7' 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
7 See id. at 302.
2011] 73
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litical propaganda."" The Supreme Court upheld the right of United
States citizens to receive information from outside the United States,
notwithstanding the fact that no person or entity had a right to send
the information." The core idea is that if a law infringes upon the
ability of American citizens to receive information, then it infringes
upon what the First Amendment protects, namely "the freedom of
speech," not the freedom of particular speakers.82
III. SUPPORT TO FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS
PROFESSOR NEUBORNE: The other key case argued in the
2009 Term was Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project." If Citizens
United is arguably the most intensive protection of the First Amend-
ment in the country's history, then Holder is a continuation of what
one may call the "nylon curtain."8 4 During the Cold War, the United
States correctly excoriated the Soviet Union for maintaining an Iron
Curtain and a Berlin Wall designed to wall its citizens off from the
outside world. For many years, the United States has operated a
"nylon curtain"-nothing like the Iron Curtain-but nevertheless, in-
consistent with the tenets of a free society.86 Most obviously, the
Cuban embargo blocks Americans from buying books from Cuba be-
cause, allegedly, the purchase of the books will provide foreign ex-
change to Cuba.8 7 Similarly, travel to Cuba and a few other verboten
so See id.
8 See id. at 305, 307.
82 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 ("Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the
First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. Prohi-
bited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some
but not others.").
83 130 S. Ct. 2705.
8 See Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America's National Bor-
der and the Free Flow ofldeas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719, 720-21 (1985) (describing the
"nylon curtain" as a "network of regulations and statutes that . . . [is intended] to keep for-
eign ideas out" using the national border as an "information barrier," proving to be a "dis-
cernible impediment to the free flow of ideas").
85 See Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, Address in West Berlin: Remarks at
the Brandenburg Gate (June 12, 1987), available at http://www.ronaldreagan.com/sp_ 11.
html.
86 See Neuborne & Shapiro, supra note 84, at 720.
87 See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (2010) (prohibiting expor-
tation and transfer of funds to Cuba).
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places are still off limits to Americans.
Holder is in the same tradition. It is a case that forbids an
American from providing material support to a group on the foreign
terrorist list.89 There are about thirty groups listed, from around the
world, which have been found to engage in terrorist activities. 90
Among those listed are a Kurdish group, the Partiya Karkeran Kur-
distan, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.9' Several individ-
uals and organizations wanted to inform the groups of peaceful ways
to deal with their grievances, such as filing complaints with the Unit-
ed Nations. 92 They wanted to show the groups that there were inter-
national law approaches that would make it unnecessary to resort to
violence. 93 The government took the position that these contacts
constituted the grant of material support to a terrorist group,94 even
though they were well-intentioned and wholly verbal, since such
training might strengthen terrorist groups by making them appear
more respectable.
The Supreme Court ruled in a six-to-three decision that the
material support statute, which makes it a crime for an American citi-
zen to contribute in any way to a foreign terrorist group, was consti-
tutional as applied to the plaintiffs. 95  All agree that contributing
money to such groups-even if the reason behind the contribution is
to support a worthy, non-violent cause--can be forbidden because
money is fungible.96 Teaching somebody how to file a complaint in
8 Id. § 515.560(a) (2010) (allowing specific categories of travel by citizens subject to ju-
risdiction in the United States to Cuba authorized only by general license or on "a case-by-
case basis by a specific license for travel").
'9 130 S. Ct. at 2730-31 (holding that prohibiting the plaintiffs' material support of foreign
terrorist groups does not violate their freedom of speech under the First Amendment).
90 See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997).
91 Id.
92 Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2716.
9 See id.
9 See id. at 2713-14.
9 Id. at 2712. The statute states in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any
person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2010).
9 See Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2725-26 (stating that terrorist organizations may not keep sep-
arate funds for violent and peaceful activity and therefore money given to the organization
for peaceful purposes can be used by the terrorist organization to finance weapons).
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the International Human Rights Court is, however, not fungible.17
Yet the Court held that if one cooperates with a terrorist group by
providing that kind of assistance, such activity is to be considered
criminal. 98 While "[i]ndependent advocacy that might be viewed as
promoting the [terrorist] group's legitimacy is not covered" by the
statute, 99 any kind of interaction with the group will risk a criminal
penalty. 0o Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy joined the majority
opinion.'
IV. RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS ON PUBLIC PROPERTY
Salazar v. Buonol02 was the only Establishment Clause case
heard last year by the Court. This case involved a Latin cross in the
Mojave National Preserve ("Preserve") located in California. 103 The
Veterans of Foreign Wars had erected the cross in the Preserve to
honor World War I veterans.1 04 The cross was quite large and was
visible from a roadway nearly one hundred feet away.0 s The cross
also immediately became a gathering place for Easter mass.'0 6  The
suit was brought by Frank Buono, a retired employee of the National
9 Id. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("There is no obvious way in which undertaking ad-
vocacy for political change through peaceful means or teaching the PKK and LTTE, say,
how to petition the United Nations for political change is fungible with other resources that
might be put to more sinister ends in the way that donations of money, food, or computer
training are fungible. It is far from obvious that these advocacy activities can themselves be
redirected, or will free other resources that can be directed, towards terrorist ends.").
98 Id. at 2728 (majority opinion).
9 Id. at 2726.
o See id at 2728-29. The Court elaborated:
Given the sensitive interests in national security and foreign affairs at
stake, the political branches have adequately substantiated their determi-
nation that, to serve the Government's interest in preventing terrorism, it
was necessary to prohibit providing material support in the form of train-
ing, expert advice, personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups,
even if the supporters meant to promote only the groups' nonviolent
ends.
Holder, 130 S. Ct. at 2728-29.
to' See id. at 2712.
102 130 S. Ct. 1803.
103 Id. at 1811.
'0 Id.
los Id. at 1812.
106 Id
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Park Service who frequently visited the Preserve.107 He claimed that
the sight of a religious symbol on federal lands was offensive and
therefore violated the Establishment Clause.'0o
The case went through two phases.109 In the first litigation,
the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the
presence of the cross on the public land violated the Establishment
Clause." 0 The Ninth Circuit also upheld the district court's issuance
of an injunction that forbade the government from displaying the
cross, which led to the cross being covered with a tarp, and subse-
quently, a plywood box."' The Ninth Circuit opinion was not ap-
pealed, and became res judicata on the merits.1 2  Next, Congress
enacted a statute that transferred the land on which the cross stood to
the Veterans of Foreign Wars, in exchange for the government re-
ceiving land from Henry Sandoz and his spouse.113 After the trans-
fer, the cross would stand on private land."' The Ninth Circuit deci-
sion invalidated the transfer, treating it as a ploy to avoid its original
holding."' The Supreme Court remanded the case for additional
consideration of Congress's motives in providing for the land trans-
fer.116 Since the merits were blocked by res judicata, the Supreme
Court stated that it could not consider the merits. 17
Salazar, which had a tremendous amount of press, decided
very little. It did highlight an unfortunate trend in recent Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence-pretending that religious symbols are re-
ally secular in nature. Justice Kennedy's opinion states that Latin
crosses are not necessarily religious, and that such crosses can have
107 Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
108 Id.
109 See id. at 1812-14.
1o See id. at 1812-13.
"' Id.
112 See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1813.
" See id. at 1811-12.
114 Id. See also Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87,
§ 8121(a)-(b), 117 Stat. 1054 (2003). According to the statute, the property transferred to
the Veterans of Foreign Wars must have been maintained "as a memorial commemorating
United States participation in World War I and honoring the American veterans of that war,"
or else it would revert back to the United States. Id. § 8121(e).
11s See Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1817-18.
16 Id. at 1820-21.
117 Id. at 1815 (noting that the Government could not ask the Court to consider the district
court's reason for granting the initial injunction or the injunction's propriety).
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several meanings."' Justice Scalia made a similar point at oral ar-
gument in a very aggressive manner when he argued that the cross
was "erected as a war memorial" and that it "is the most common
symbol of . .. the resting place of the dead."" 9 In response, the law-
yer for the challengers-a young ACLU lawyer from California-
said: "Justice Scalia, . . . [t]he cross is the most common symbol of
the resting place of Christians. I have been in Jewish cemeteries.
There is never a cross on a tombstone of a Jew." 20 The comment in-
furiated Justice Scalia, who responded: "I don't think you can leap
from that to the conclusion that the only war dead that [the] cross
honors are the Christian war dead. I think that's an outrageous con-
clusion."l 2' The audience was taken aback by the vehemence of Jus-
tice Scalia's comments.122  One attorney present at the argument
noted the insensitivity of the comment.123 If disputes about religious
imagery can trigger that kind of anger and irrational behavior in a
Supreme Court Justice who should know better, imagine what it can
do in the real world when government becomes entangled in religious
disputes.
V. CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUALITY AND FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION
PROFESSOR DORF: A case that involved a conflict between
equality and freedom of association was Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez,2 4 which came out of the University of California's Hast-
ings College of the Law, in San Francisco.125 Hastings has a Regis-
tered Student Organization ("RSO") program under which eligible
" Id. at 1820. Justice Kennedy stated that the "[p]lacement of the cross on Government-
owned land was not an attempt to set the imprimatur of the state on a particular creed. Ra-
ther, those who erected the cross intended simply to honor our Nation's fallen soldiers." Id
at 1816-17.
119 Transcript of Oral Argument at 38-39, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472).
120 Id. at 39.
121 id.
122 See Tony Mauro, At High Court, Cross Words Over Mojave Memorial, LAW.COM (Oct.
8, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202434373566 (stating that at the culmina-
tion of the exchange between Justice Scalia and the attorney for the ACLU, "[y]ou could
audibly hear people breathing in").
123 See id.
124 130 S. Ct. 2971.
125 Id. at 2978.
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student groups receive funding from the school and a preferred status,
enabling them to use the school's e-mail system to send out messages
to the entire student body and to receive first dibs on available class-
room space to host speakers and meetings.126 To qualify as a RSO, a
student organization must abide by a policy that forbids discrimina-
tion on various grounds, including, as proved relevant in this case, re-
ligion and sexual orientation.127 The law school interpreted its nondi-
scrimination policy to require that each RSO accept all-comers,
meaning that RSOs have to accept as members any students who
want to join.128
The Christian Legal Society is a national umbrella organiza-
tion for fundamentalist Christian student organizations on law school
campuses.129 The local chapters tend to be small student organiza-
tions, and in order to be affiliated with the national organization, the
student organizations must adopt by-laws that promote the national
organization's tenets.130 One of the tenets is that members must ad-
here to a statement of faith.' 3 ' The statement of faith has various re-
ligious elements, including traditional sexual morality, which is in-
terpreted as requiring, among other things, that one cannot be
"unrepentantly" gay.132 The Christian Legal Society applied for RSO
status at Hastings.133 After reviewing the Christian Legal Society's
constitution, Hastings determined that the organization's by-laws
were inconsistent with the all-comers policy and the nondiscrimina-
tion policy.134 As a result, the Christian Legal Society sued Hastings,
but lost in the lower federal courts.135
As a threshold matter in the Supreme Court, the Christian Le-
gal Society argued that the nondiscrimination policy should be read
as written-prohibiting discrimination-rather than as "a requirement
that all [RSOs] accept all[-]comers."l 36 However, the parties had sti-
"6 See id at 2979.
127 See id
128 id
129 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.
130 id
132 id
134 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980.
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pulated at the district court level that the all-comers policy applied to
RSOs."
The Christian Legal Society further argued that the applica-
tion of the all-comers policy disproportionately affected groups of
faith.138  The Supreme Court majority rejected this argument "be-
cause '[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on
some speakers or messages but not others.' "3
That left the Justices with the task of sorting the dispute into
one of two different lines of cases.14 0 One could think of Christian
Legal Society as a funding case, in particular, what is known as a
"public forum" case.14 1 If a government entity decides to fund organ-
izations or provide access to certain sorts of government property not
counting as a "public forum," it may attach conditions to the funding
or property use so long as the conditions are viewpoint-neutral and
reasonable.142 Under this line of cases, it seemed clear that the Chris-
tian Legal Society would not prevail. In effect, Hastings was arguing
that it was not singling out the Christian Legal Society but neutrally
applying its all-comers rule to every RSO. The Hastings bicycle
club, the Hastings wine tasting club, and even the Hastings branch of
the Ku Klux Klan-if such an organization existed-must accept all
students to qualify for RSO status.14 3  This was a neutral policy,
Hastings said, because it applied to all groups and applied to the con-
duct of discrimination rather than applying based on viewpoint.
Moreover, Hastings argued (and the Court agreed), the all-comers
policy was reasonable as a means of ensuring that there was open
137 See id.
13 Id. at 2994 (stating that the Christian Legal Society argued that the policy "systemati-
cally and predictably burden[ed] most heavily those groups whose viewpoints [weire out of
favor with the campus mainstream").
139 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)).
140 See id. at 2984 (noting that the Christian Legal Society supported its argument that the
all comers policy violated its First Amendment rights by relying on "two lines of deci-
sions").
141 See id. (stating that "in a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis
to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place li-
mitations on speech").
142 See id.
143 Id. at 2993 (stating that "Hastings' all-comers requirement draws no distinction be-
tween groups based on their message or perspective").
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access to RSOs so that "leadership, educational, and social opportuni-
ties ... [we]re available to all students." 1"
The hard question in Christian Legal Society was whether to
treat the case as presenting issues of government funding or as impli-
cating a second line of cases-those involving freedom of expressive
association. These cases hold that even a neutral nondiscrimination
policy-such as the one that New Jersey applied to all places of pub-
lic accommodation, including the Boy Scouts (per a broad reading of
state law)-may unconstitutionally infringe on an organization's
right to expressive association. 14 5  Another case involved an Irish-
American group that wanted to exclude a sub-group from marching
under an openly gay banner as part of its St. Patrick's Day Parade. 146
The Irish-American group was held to have constitutional right to ex-
clude the sub-group, even though the City of Boston was applying a
general nondiscrimination policy in seeking to condition a parade
permit on nondiscrimination.147
Thus, if the Court had viewed Christian Legal Society as a
freedom of association case, Christian Legal Society would have re-
ceived a constitutional exemption from the Hastings all-comers poli-
cy.148 But a majority instead viewed it as a funding case and denied
an exemption.149  That approach was apparently inconsistent with
Hurley, the case involving the St. Patrick's Day Parade. So how did
the majority reconcile the cases? The key for the majority was the
nature of the forum, although the opinion relegates the crucial move
to a footnote.' 50 Hurley involved access to the streets, which are a
"public forum"'' in which government restrictions on expression are
subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny. In a public forum,
'" Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2989.
145 Id at 2984-85. See also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (hold-
ing that "[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group's free-
dom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the
group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints").
146 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
561 (1995).
147 Id. at 580-81.
148 The Christian Legal Society would have received an exemption if the forced inclusion
of certain individuals affected the group's ability to advocate its viewpoint. See Dale, 530
U.S. at 648.
149 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2995.
1so See id. at 2986 n.14.
Is' See Hurley, 530 U.S. at 579.
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government regulation must not only be viewpoint-neutral; people
have an affirmative right of access to the government property.152 By
contrast, the RSO program was a limited forum of the government's
own creation, and so the government-here Hastings, a public law
school-was held to a less strict standard. 5 3 For example, if the
government establishes a public theater for community productions
for the works of Shakespeare, it cannot censor a production of Sha-
kespeare's Henry VI, Part 3 on the ground that it presents an anti-war
(or any other) message, for that would be viewpoint discrimination.
But if one wants to present plays by Christopher Marlowe or Arthur
Miller, the government may constitutionally insist on reserving the
theater for its designated purpose.
Understanding the Christian Legal Society case as part of the
Court's designated forum doctrine reconciles it with broader First
Amendment jurisprudence. However, that does not necessarily mean
that the all-comers policy is sensible. Although I wrote a brief in the
case on behalf of the Association of American Law Schools in sup-
port of Hastings, I do have doubts about the wisdom (as distinguished
from the constitutionality) of the all-comers policy. If you tell the
Republican students that they have to admit Democrats, they may
cease to be the Republican students (and vice-versa). What should
Hastings do about the Law Review? Does it have to take all-comers?
Here, as elsewhere, to say that a policy is constitutional is not to say
that it is perfect or even, on balance, wise.
VI. CONCLUSION
The First Amendment was at issue in some of the Supreme
Court's most significant cases of the October 2009 Term. Collective-
ly, these cases may have a considerable impact on many aspects of
American life, from the way political campaigns are financed to bat-
tling the War on Terror and the ability of organizations at publicly-
funded institutions to control their membership while continuing to
receive funding. The repercussions of these cases will surely be felt
152 See id. ("Our tradition of free speech commands that a speaker who takes to the street
corner to express his views in this way should be free from interference by the State based
on the content of what he says.").
Is Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2984 n. 11 (providing a list of various public forums such as
public streets, parks, and government property not designated as a public forum, but opened
up for that purpose).
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